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Abstract | My study investigates how Japan nationalized the cultural assets from their 
colonies and foreign countries when the Cultural Assets Preservation Act was legislated 
in 1950. It also analyzes how Japan enforced the nationalization and restitution of the 
cultural properties to Korea during the Korea-Japan Normalization Talks in the 1950s 
and 1960s. During the fourteen years of Korea-Japan Normalization Talks, the cultural 
properties, which were excavated out of the Korean Peninsula and redefined as Japanese 
properties, were only partly restituted to Korea. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
however, proceeded with it in secret. The Diet and Japanese people only learned of the 
event from Korean or Japanese newspapers after the fact. Although Japan restituted the 
cultural properties to Korea, it still treated them as “national properties” of Japan. This 
fact revealed the limitation of the Korea-Japan Normalization Talks and the legacy of 
the Japanese colonial rule, which resulted in the Korea-Japan agreement that the Korean 
cultural properties are “the private properties of the Japanese people” or “the belongings 
of the Japanese people.”
Keywords | Korea-Japan Normalization Talks, restitution of cultural properties, the list 
of restituted cultural properties, Cultural Assets Preservation Act, Yangsan Couple’s 
Grave
Introduction 
In October 2012, a group of nine Koreans stole two Buddha statues from the 
temples in Tsushima, attempting to smuggle them into Korea. The incident 
itself, the robbing of national cultural properties1 by Koreans in Japanese 
territory, was appalling to most Japanese people. But they were even more 
* RHYU Mina (inagi1@daum.net) is a research fellow at the Institute of Japanese Studies, 
Kookmin University.
1. In Japan, it was only after 1950 that the term “cultural properties” became widely used, replacing 
other terms such as antiquities, artifacts, relics, important art works, etc. This paper standardizes 
the use of “cultural properties” for convenience. 
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startled by the provisional injunction by the Korean Ministry of Justice, which 
essentially forbade the restitution2 of the stolen properties to Japan. The Korean 
government established a state-level investigation committee for the third time 
since Korea-Japan Normalization Talks, in order to carry out a full investigation 
on how the properties had been taken out from Korea in the first place. The 
result of this investigation would determine whether or not the statues would be 
returned to Japan. 
In Korea, many people claimed that the government should not return the 
Buddha statues to Japan, at least until Japan return Korea’s cultural properties 
that were illicitly displaced in Japan during the colonial period. The Korean 
government also had the incentive to initiate discussions regarding the 
restitution of Korea’s cultural properties in Japan before simply returning the 
objects back to the Japanese. In fact, the Japanese government requested the 
restitution of the two Buddha statues during the ministerial meetings between 
the chiefs of Cultural Affairs in 2013 and 2014, before Korea demanded to 
discuss the status of 67,000 Korean cultural properties, which, from their 
viewpoint, had been illicitly displaced in Japan. 
Japan has expressed apprehension toward such a move from Korea. One 
weekly magazine claimed that within Korea there existed groups of thieves who 
stole Japan’s cultural properties and re-sold them for profits. The magazine 
claimed such activities had been thriving, especially after the former Prime 
Minister Kan Naoto returned the Royal Protocols (Ŭigwe) of the Chosŏn 
Dynasty in 2010. Furthermore, the article emphasized that the stolen Buddha 
statues were in fact properties of Japan, for the Normalization Treaty of 1965 
had completely and finally settled the problems of properties and claim rights 
between the two countries (Gomi 2013). The impact of the article requires 
further examination. Yet Japanese society is upset over Korea’s behavior for not 
only stealing Japan’s nationally-designated cultural properties but also its refusal 
to return them to Japan. In addition, some argue that the issue of the restitution 
of cultural properties has been settled by the 1965 Normalization Treaty, and it 
is undesirable for the issue to resurface as the cause of further diplomatic 
tension. 
Fifty years have passed since Korea and Japan “settled” the relationship as 
colony and empire and established diplomatic relations with the signing of 
Normalization Treaty in 1965. Yet this very treaty often stands in the way of full-
fledged cooperation between the two countries, and the necessity for the 
2. The term “restitution” or “return” is used mostly from the Korean perspective, while the 
Japanese officials often use the term such as “donation” or “gifts.” For convenience, this paper will 
use “restitution” or “return” as a standard term. 
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revaluation of the treaty has been widely advocated in recent years. My study 
responds to such growing demand for the intensive in-depth analysis of the 
context and meaning of the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty.
Traditionally, the discussions on the return of cultural properties between 
Korea and Japan have revolved around simplistic yet conflicting claims, which 
has achieved nothing but repeated dead-ends. Since the initiation of the Korea-
Japan talks in 1952, Korea has demanded the restitution of all cultural properties 
that have been taken out from Korea, while the Japanese government insisted 
that they are not obliged to return the objects they have “legally obtained 
through legitimate procedures.” Fortunately, the disclosure of “diplomatic 
documents of the Korea-Japan talks” have allowed room for empirical 
evaluations and analysis of the bilateral negotiation processes.3 For example, the 
documents reveal that, during negotiation talks, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) considered returning Korea’s cultural properties as diplomatic 
leverage. However, the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, as well as 
the Cultural Assets Preservation Committee, which were in charge of the 
preservation and management of the historical objects, expressed strong 
opposition. Existing studies illustrate that the issue became especially complex 
because the discord within the Japanese government derived from the question 
of the “legitimacy” of its colonial rule, while the Korean government designated 
Korea’s cultural properties in Japan as “plundered assets.”4 
These previous works are characterized by the empirical analysis of the 
restitution process of cultural properties between the countries and focus on 
how the historical documents elucidate the diverging perceptions of colonial 
rule between the former empire and colony. It took two years for the two 
governments to compile a list of cultural properties to be returned from Japan to 
Korea. The reason for such protracted negotiations was rooted in the conflicting 
understanding of the nature of colonial rule between the two governments—
whether it was “peaceful domination” or “forceful occupation.”5 In the end, as 
the studies revealed, the Korean government took charge of compiling the list of 
cultural properties, for which they referred to the records of the Government-
General of Korea, as well as various exhibitions held in Japan during the colonial 
period. These findings were based on the analysis of disclosed documents 
produced during the Korea-Japan talks. The fact suggests that these historical 
3. For more studies that used the disclosed documents, refer to Rhyu Mina (2009, 2010) and Park 
Hun (2010). 
4. For more detailed analysis, refer to Rhyu Mina (2009). 
5. In relation to the issue of claim rights, the discussions regarding the list of cultural properties 
require further academic research. Refer to Rhyu Mina (2010).
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records provide invaluable insights into the nature of the Normalization Treaty. 
My research is an attempt to shed light on Japan’s restitution process of 
Korean cultural properties. Recognizing the importance of the documents from 
the Korea-Japan talks, it draws on more detailed empirical analysis based on my 
prior research on the subject. Specifically, I will focus on the “limitation” of the 
Korea-Japan talks that became apparent in the process of bilateral negotiations 
surrounding the restitution of cultural properties. 
The Korea-Japan talks, along with the discussion of the restitution of 
cultural properties began about two years after the enactment of the Cultural 
Assets Preservation Act in Japan. After the defeat, Japan initiated domestic 
debates in order to designate the “imported” cultural properties from former 
colonies and occupied territories as “national properties.” Yet soon the viability 
of the law was questioned as the demands for the restitution of cultural 
properties surfaced during the Korea-Japan Talks. 
In this paper, I shed light on how Japan managed the imported cultural 
properties during the legislation process of the Cultural Assets Preservation Act, 
and evaluate the restitution procedures of the cultural properties from Japan to 
Korea. Then I examine on what ground Japan has or has not returned Korea’s 
cultural properties. Specifically, I will analyze the reason that, despite avid 
demand by their Korean counterpart, the Japanese government refused to 
return the relics from the Yangsan Couple’s Grave in 1965. This analysis will 
reveal an aspect of the diverging perceptions of each other between Korea and 
Japan, upon which today’s bilateral relations is founded. 
Management of Displaced Cultural Properties in Japan after 
World War II
The issue of displaced cultural properties became a matter of great concern not 
only for the former colonies and occupied territories, but also for the General 
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP). In 
November 1945, the GHQ requested the Japanese government to turn in a list of 
national treasures and cultural properties in an attempt to grasp the number of 
all cultural artifacts that existed in Japan. Yet the context of the report showed 
highly passive attitudes of the Japanese officials. For example, it took two years 
for the Japanese government to compile the list of cultural artifacts, which was 
not turned in until May 1947. Furthermore, the passivity of the Japanese 
government can be inferred from the fact that this report listed only one item to 
fall under the category of “national treasure” or “cultural heritage.” Dissatisfied 
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with the list, in September, the GHQ requested the government to submit an 
additional list of foreign artifacts by January 1, 1948.6 Yet the Japanese 
government only replied that there were no such items to be listed. This attitude 
of the Japanese officials remained consistent with their response to similar 
requests filed by the Chinese government. 
What attracted the most attention among the foreign cultural properties in 
Japan after the war were the Chinese artifacts. China began its own 
investigations on the “plundered” cultural properties in October 1945 and 
submitted the “list of plundered cultural properties” to the GHQ’s Civil Property 
Custodian in January 1949. The GHQ requested an investigation on the list of 
artifacts to the Special Property Division of Japan’s MOFA, which revealed the 
whereabouts of 20,173 books and about one thousand antiques that originated 
from China (Morimoto 2010, 677-78). The Japanese officials explained that 
most of the artifacts listed in the document had already been returned to China, 
and only a small number of them remained in Japan. According to them, the 
Japanese government had held onto them because it feared the loss of the 
historical artifacts in the midst of wartime turmoil. 
The demands for the restitution of cultural properties displaced by the 
Japanese from the former colonies and occupied territories arose not only from 
China but also from other regions. For example, soon after the liberation, a civic 
academic group in Korea submitted a resolution to General MacArthur in 
October 1945, demanding the restitution of plundered books and treasures. 
They also submitted a list of displaced properties to the US Occupation 
Government in December 1945. Yet no record can be found as to whether the 
GHQ took any responsive measures regarding these requests (Munhwajaech’ŏng 
2005a, 99; Rhyu Mina 2009). 
Japan’s perfunctory attitudes toward the requests for the restitution of 
cultural properties by the former colonies and occupied territories were 
exacerbated as the US policies toward Japan underwent a significant shift. The 
incentives for the US to incorporate Japan as a “strategic ally” grew drastically as 
the US-Soviet tension escalated and as China’s domestic political order began to 
challenge the international liberal order. The shifts in the GHQ’s Japan policies 
6. Here, artworks of foreign origin referred to those that had been acquired in the colonial 
territories after July 7, 1937 (and preserved in Japan at that time), whose market price was worth 
more than five-thousand yen each. According to a note sent from the Civil Information and 
Education Section to the Civil Property Custodian, the reason that the line was drawn on the date 
of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was because many items had already been returned overseas 
and due to the unwillingness of the counterparts to cooperate, it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to handle the issues (Morimoto 2010, 674).
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were the results of the efforts by the Occupation Forces to mitigate Japan’s war 
responsibility, which also reflected on the issue of reparation for the displaced 
cultural properties. For example, Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur 
opposed to the idea of handing over Japan’s cultural properties as “reparation 
payment” to the former colonies, and cooperated fully with Japan’s policies of 
preserving its own cultural properties (Morimoto 2010, 652). Needless to say, 
Japan was in no position to completely ignore the requests from China and 
other former colonies. Yet Japan found no reason to actively deal with the issue, 
especially after its strategic importance to the US grew as “the bulwark against 
communist aggression.”
Constitutional Process of the Cultural Assets Preservation Act 
and Japanese Provisions on the Cultural Properties of Foreign 
Origins 
Even though Japan evaded responding to the restitution requests by the former 
colonies and occupied territories, they were nonetheless distressed over the task 
of dealing with the cultural properties. Especially during the constitutional 
process of the Cultural Assets Preservation Act that was enacted in 1950, the 
Japanese government attempted to find the basis upon which these artifacts 
could rationally be described as “Japan’s” cultural properties. 
The discussions regarding the Cultural Assets Preservation Act began as 
soon as the war ended. Defeated Japan advocated the construction of a 
democratic, pacifist, and culture-oriented state. After the devastating warfare, 
Japan faced the necessity of rebirth as such state in order to rejoin the 
international community. Preserving Japan’s cultural assets was one of the 
strategic approaches to achieve this goal. At the same time, in the midst of 
severe food shortage and economic havoc, the central government found it 
increasingly difficult to track down not only antique art works but also cultural 
properties categorized as “national treasures,” since many of them were 
misplaced or being sold to foreign buyers.
One incident that accelerated domestic discussion regarding the preservation 
of cultural properties was the fire at Hōryū-ji Temple in 1949. Hōryū-ji Temple 
was built in the seventh century A.D., making it one of the oldest wooden 
buildings in the world, and it had been considered one of Japan’s most 
important cultural sites.7 The fire that broke out in January of 1949 caused 
7. It is now registered as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
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severe damages to the wall paintings in the Kondō (Sanctuary Hall). A shocking 
loss of a piece of ancient culture triggered heated policy discussions on the 
preservation of cultural properties. 
During the constitutional process of formulating the law, two issues came to 
the forefront: taxation on the owners of cultural properties and the handling of 
cultural properties of foreign origin. Imposing taxes on the owners of cultural 
properties during this time of severe economic disarray carried the risk of 
serious backlash from the masses. Furthermore, placing financial responsibility 
of repairing damaged artifacts to owners was a sensitive matter; the owners who 
were unwilling to finance the repair often hid their properties when the burden 
fell on them. In the end, the government decided only the culturally-important 
artifacts should be exempted from taxation, without providing detailed 
instructions as to how other cultural properties should be managed, which led 
to endless hiding and selling of the cultural properties. 
On the other hand, the issues surrounding the handling of foreign artifacts 
developed in a more complex manner. In essence, labeling those artifacts as 
“Japan’s” properties brought up the inevitable question of the legitimacy of the 
imperial expansion to the regions where the products originated. It required 
rigorous assessment of how each property was purchased and carried over to 
mainland Japan. This analysis would allow the government to argue for the 
legitimate connection between the foreign cultural properties and the Japanese 
people. In particular, the designation of foreign cultural assets as one of Japan’s 
“national treasures” needed an indisputable reason to be named as such, and this 
task needed to be addressed thoroughly within the implementation of the new 
law. The Japanese lawmakers engaged in fierce debates on how to include these 
foreign cultural properties to the list of “national” treasures, and the discussion 
extended also to the problem of how to preserve them. For example, during the 
subcommittee hearing of the Upper House Culture Committee held on April 19, 
1949, Diet member Iwama Masao questioned the limitation of the term 
“national treasure” used in the draft and addressed the complex relationship 
between foreign cultural properties and Japan:
Iwama Masao: I would like to ask a few questions on Article 2, the clause that 
stipulates how to select the cultural assets to be preserved by this law. According 
to this [draft], Article 2 Paragraph 1 talks about including the “buildings, 
paintings, sculptures, and other craftworks that the people have passed down 
since old times.” But as it has already been raised before, I believe there are quite 
a number of artifacts that were brought into Japan from abroad after the Meiji 
period, and among them, some are even considered as world-class cultural 
heritage pieces. What I wish to address here is, how do we handle these 
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properties, and if we are to exclude them from the list of artifacts to be preserved 
by this law, wouldn’t it mean that those great cultural properties owned by Japan 
and the Japanese people could be scattered around or poorly managed? These are 
my concerns and I would like to hear your opinion. 
Government Official (Iwamura Shinobu): … Let me give you an example. There 
is a collection of Chinese bronze wares preserved at Sumiya Seiryo [sic] of 
Sumitomo,8 and as you have pointed out, these are some of the most valuable 
artifacts imported [to Japan] between the mid-Meiji to Taishō periods, and I 
believe some of them are considered to be invaluable cultural art. Another example 
would be Tongdian [literally “comprehensive institutions”] of the Song Dynasty, 
one of which is stored at the Imperial Household and another lies in the hands of 
Tenri University. This version of Northern Song’s Tongdian came from China 
sometime during the Meiji period, and these are extremely rare and treasured 
pieces of historical writings. When I think about how to handle these specific 
cases, the law intends to protect those items that “have been passed down to the 
people since old times”—and if we were only talking about “the people” and how 
these items are passed down to them, we do not need to consider how long it has 
been in the hands of the people—and thus, it could be just a matter of five or 
even three years. But such an argument is too sophistic. I have given this a lot of 
thought and have been trying to come up with a more fitting phrase. If I may 
present my own personal view, the interpretation of the law may perhaps be 
divided into two parts. One is the protection of the important cultural properties 
that originated in Japan and have been passed down through generations since 
ancient times, most of which are already integrated well into the people’s lives. 
Another part deals with some of the exceptional cases that we have just discussed 
—the protection of the foreign artifacts, which can fall under the category of 
important cultural properties that have indeed been “passed down to the people.” 
…
Government Official (Takeuchi Toshio): … In Article 1, the phrase “cultural 
heritage (bunkateki isan)” is used to designate the cultural properties that this law 
intends to preserve, but such terminology potentially limits the interpretation of 
cultural properties to only those handcrafted by the Japanese people. I still have 
no confidence in connecting “cultural heritage” with “what have been passed 
down to the people.” And if the purpose of this law is to preserve not only what 
have been created by the Japanese people but also those imported artifacts 
considered as pieces of important heritage by the Western cultural standard, it 
must be clarified so in the law. Further, if the central concern of this law is limited 
to the protection of cultural heritage made by the very hands of the Japanese 
people, then it would only mean that the government is not going to concern 
themselves with the whereabouts or maintenance of these invaluable foreign 
8. Sumiya Seiryo is unidentifiable and it might be a miswriting of Sen’oku Hakukokan in Kyoto, 
which is known for Sumitomo family’s collection of old Chinese bronze wares and also known as 
the Sumitomo Collection. 
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objects that entered after the Meiji period. These are potentially significant 
counterviews which could derive from the use of differing terminologies. (Dai 
5-kai Kokkai Sangiin Monbu Iinkai Bunka Shōiinkai kaigiroku, 1949)
In other words, in order to include highly valuable foreign artifacts to the list of 
“Japanese cultural properties” to be preserved by the law, it was necessary to 
establish a tangible relationship between the cultural assets and the Japanese 
people. Thus, it was pragmatic to emphasize the current status of the foreign 
artifacts—the fact that they existed in Japan—rather than the relational history 
of each cultural property. They arrived at the conclusion that, in order to 
demonstrate how these foreign artifacts had been “handed down” to the Japanese 
people, it was necessary to modify the use of explanatory reasoning and 
terminologies. 
Based on this logic, the Japanese officials came to agree upon the modification 
of the terms on the relationship between the foreign properties and the people, 
which, above anything else, emphasized the Japanese people’s “ownership” of the 
foreign properties rather than their origins or historical value. In other words, in 
search of both “nationalistic” and “pragmatic” reasoning for incorporating 
foreign artifacts as “Japanese properties,” it was inevitable for the purpose of the 
law to focus on the “preservation” of the artifacts rather than the determination 
of the properties’ historical and cultural values (Dai 5-kai Kokkai Sangiin Monbu 
Iinkai Bunka Shōiinkai kaigiroku, 1949, statement of Suzuki Ken’ichi). Hence the 
purpose of the law was “to preserve and utilize the cultural properties as the 
basis of the advancement of the people’s cultural consciousness as well as of 
world culture” (Bunkazai Hogohō, No. 318[1951]). And, in the law, “the cultural 
assets” were defined as both tangible and intangible cultural artifacts of “high 
historical and artistic value, including archeological materials, intangible 
cultural heritage, as well as folk materials and traditions that are indicative of 
the transformation of the people’s lives, and other relics of high academic value.”
The question of the connection between the people and the cultural 
properties of foreign origins was dealt by the “selection criteria for the designation 
of cultural properties,” supplementary regulations to the law, which claimed that 
the “foreign properties (toraihin) can be designated as important cultural 
property or national treasure if close connection can be found between the 
objects and Japan” (Bunkazai Hogohō, No. 318[1951]). In other words, the 
central focus of Japan’s Cultural Assets Preservation Act was to “preserve and 
utilize the cultural properties” in order to enhance the culture of both the 
Japanese people and the world, rather than to determine the origin and history 
of each asset. In this context, it became possible to designate some of the 
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cultural assets of foreign origins as Japan’s “national treasures” or “important 
cultural properties” regardless of how they had been brought to Japan in the 
past. 
The Cultural Assets Preservation Act faced another challenge during the 
Korea-Japan talks, as the restitution requests from Korea questioned the efficacy 
of the logic that lay behind the law. About two years after the law was enacted, 
the legitimacy of the cultural assets as “Japanese properties” was questioned. The 
next section reveals the procedure through which Japan rationalized returning 
“Japanese properties” back to Korea. 
Handing Over Japan’s “National Properties” as Gift to Korea: 
Another Aspect of Restitution of Korea’s Cultural Properties
As discussed above, with the enactment of Cultural Assets Preservation Act, the 
cultural properties of foreign origin categorized as toraihin were designated as 
Japan’s “national properties,” and they included some artifacts that had been 
brought over from the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, the restitutions of Korea’s 
cultural properties, which took place in 1958 (106 cultural artifacts were returned 
to Korea) as well as in 1965 with the signing of Normalization Treaty, were the 
acts of returning Japan’s “national properties” to Korea. How, then, was such a 
practice rationalized? To put it simply, the act of restitution became possible 
because of the political maneuvering by the Japanese government and the 
MOFA. 
In April of 1958, the MOFA returned 106 of Korea’s cultural properties in 
confidence, about which Japan’s National Diet was informed only after the fact. 
The Diet remained oblivious to the restitution process when it took place. Even 
though the MOFA was not obliged to release all information to the Diet, it was 
extremely unconventional for the ministry to “give away” national treasures 
during the talks without preliminary reporting to the Diet. From the MOFA’s 
standpoint, leaving out the information was intentional in order to avoid severe 
opposition by the lawmakers, as was made clear in the remarks by Itagaki 
Osamu, then director-general of Asian Affairs Bureau. Mori Motojirō, a member 
of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), criticized the MOFA during the Diet discussions 
held on May 31, 1958:
Mori Motojirō: Another thing. The Tokyo Newspaper (Tōkyō shinbun) briefly 
mentioned this issue, the restitution of cultural properties to Korea. Perhaps we 
have forgotten about this issue because we had an election took place right after 
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this, but I would like to ask first and foremost whether the ministry has made an 
announcement as to how many of the artifacts were returned to Korea and for 
what reason. Also, I would like to know why the ministry did not make an 
appropriate announcement before those artifacts were returned. It is my 
understanding that the agreement was made on December 31 of last year. And 
while Korea wanted to release an official statement on the decision—on getting 
their properties back—our government did not wish to let our people know 
about it, so it remained unannounced. But I ask you, if we are not doing anything 
bad or immoral, wouldn’t it have been more appropriate to make the decision 
known in a timely manner? What are your thoughts on that?
Itagaki Osamu: Concerning the issue of cultural properties, in fact, when we 
concluded the agreement on December 31 of last year, we made an oral agreement 
that, as a gesture of friendship, Japan would return some of the cultural properties 
as gifts to Korea. But at the time, we also agreed not to make any official statement 
regarding this decision—and as you have mentioned, we sent over 106 artifacts 
back to Korea afterwards, but the government has not made an official 
announcement due to the aforementioned agreement with Korea. … 
Mori Motojirō: What you mean is that before those artifacts were returned to 
Korea, those were national properties of Japan and they were given away without 
the people knowing that fact. This is a kind of transaction we only see on the 
black market, isn’t it? … Well, the properties are already given to the Koreans, so 
there is no sense bumbling over this now. We are the only ones who have been 
oblivious to the fact, while the other party must be pleased with getting them 
back. Such a bizarre transaction is truly inexcusable, and it will remain a stigma 
for the Kishi cabinet. I do hope that the government would act swiftly and make 
an official announcement to gain public understanding. (Dai 28-kai Kokkai 
Sangiin Gaimu Iinkai kaigiroku [Hei 1-gō], 1958)
As can be inferred from the above excerpts, it was the MOFA that took the 
initiative in the restitution process in 1958, and both the Japanese Diet and the 
people remained unaware of the diplomatic transaction. In fact, the compiled 
list of artifacts by the MOFA was conducted in an “unofficial” manner, as it was 
expressed in Essentials of the Minister’s Explanation on the Korea-Related 
Cultural Properties (Kankoku kankei bunkazai ni kansuru daijin setsumei yōryō), 
released on April 14, 1958:
In addition to the delivery of the 106 artifacts, Korea strongly demands that we 
turn in the list of cultural properties that originated from Korea and that are now 
in our possession. Even though we did not make any comment on the matter, 
considering that this issue is likely to be related to the matter of repatriation of 
fishermen, we have decided to hand over the list of Korean artifacts (as indicated 
in the attached document 2) as an unofficial document to our counterpart—and 
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whether these will be returned to Korea is a matter that shall be decided in the 
future. (Gaimushō Ajia 1-ka 1958) 
In other words, the MOFA not only returned the cultural properties without 
informing the Diet, which they learned through the news report in Korea, but it 
also single-handedly complied the list of additional cultural properties upon 
Korea’s request. Not surprisingly, the Japanese Diet acrimoniously criticized the 
ministry. Yet the MOFA only responded that they were not at liberty to make 
any specific comment on the matter because the restitution of cultural 
properties was one of the issues discussed during the normalization negotiation 
(Dai 29-kai Kokkai Tokubetsukai Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai kaigiroku [3-gō], 1958). 
The more significant fact is that such criticism against the restitution of 
cultural properties to Korea developed based on their understanding that these 
artifacts were, in their view, Japan’s “national properties” and its “important 
cultural arts.” Diet member Mori’s castigation against the MOFA and the 
handling by the Kishi cabinet was, after all, rooted in his perception that the 
“returned” artifacts were, in fact, Japan’s properties. Such perspective can also be 
observed in the discussion between the JSP member Yamanaka Gorō and then- 
executive director of the Cultural Assets Preservation Committee Miyachi 
Shigeru during the forty sixth Diet Session in 1964. 
Yamanaka Gorō: … For this reason, even if we say it is not restitution but gifts, it 
is obvious that the other party would openly claim to the domestic audience that 
Japan responded to their restitution request. Under these circumstances, our 
efforts would not be appreciated by the people [of Korea] and therefore would 
not contribute to the amelioration of our bilateral relationship. Perhaps the 
policymakers and the US will be pleased, but our people will always hold a grudge.
Miyachi Shigeru: … Japan is not obligated to return the cultural properties at the 
request of the Republic of Korea. I do not believe that is the way it should be. 
However, instead of thinking of it as a “returning” process, as we are about to 
sign the Normalization Treaty, we believe such a gesture could count as an act of 
cultural cooperation, and send over an adequate number of the cultural artifacts 
among Japan’s national properties as gifts to the other party. (Dai 46-kai Kokkai 
Shūgiin Bunkyō Iinkai kaigiroku [13-gō], 1964)
Yamanaka commented that Korea should express a certain degree of “gratitude” 
for receiving Japan’s national treasures, to which a government official replied 
that the restitution of the cultural properties were conducted as a gift-giving 
gesture. In other words, to be precise, Japan’s restitution of cultural properties to 
Korea was nothing other than a sharing of Japan’s national properties with 
Korea. Japan’s stance was again made clear in the signed treaty after the 
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Normalization Talks, shown in the Agreement Record on the Treaty on Cultural 
Properties and Cultural Cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea 
signed on June 22, 1965:
Representatives of the Republic of Korea expressed their wish for the cultural 
properties that originated from Korea, which are under the ownership of the 
Japanese people, to be donated to Korea.
 Representatives of Japan stated that the Japanese government endorses 
voluntary donation of those cultural properties from the Japanese people to 
Korea, for such gesture is most likely to contribute to the promotion of cultural 
cooperation between the two countries. (Bunkazai oyobi bunka kyōryoku, 1965) 
Simply put, even in the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty and during the 
restitution process, Korea’s cultural artifacts were discussed as the “properties of 
the Japanese people,” and this framework was to be applied to all future 
transactions as well. In other words, the bilateral agreement on the restitution of 
cultural properties stipulated in the Treaty was based on the premise that the 
cultural artifacts were under “private ownership of the Japanese citizens” and 
were, in fact, owned by the “Japanese people.” 
Then on what basis did Japan select the cultural properties to be returned to 
Korea? The existing studies have been insufficient in providing a definite answer 
to the question, and it is impossible to holistically answer in this paper as well. 
Instead, we will now turn to the analyses of the Diet records and unreturned 
cultural properties, which provide an insight into the selection criteria on which 
the Japanese government decided whether or not certain artifacts should be 
returned to Korea. 
Japan’s Selection Criteria of the Cultural Properties: The Relics 
from the Yangsan Couple’s Grave
This section discusses the selection criteria and its implications for the cultural 
properties that were returned to Korea following the Diet debates surrounding 
this issue. 
On November 19, 1965, the fiftieth extraordinary Diet session was in the 
midst of discussing the text of the Normalization Treaty that had just been 
signed. The JSP member Mori inquired about the selection criteria for the 
cultural properties, including artifacts, paintings, books and other writings, 
which were to be “delivered” to Korea, and Nakamura Umekichi, a Ministry of 
Education official, replied as follows:
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Mori Motojirō: … What are the selection criteria for the artifacts, paintings, and 
books that are to be sent over to Korea? Were they based on Korea’s request, or 
did our government choose on our own? I think this should be made clear. I 
don’t see any items here on the list that have been designated as important 
cultural properties or national treasures. Does this mean that there are no 
cultural artifacts that have been brought from Korea to Japan and designated as 
important cultural properties, or are we unwilling to hand them over to Korea? I 
would like a detailed explanation on this matter. 
 On a different matter, the government of Japan delivered 106 cultural 
properties to Korea as a gesture for promoting friendship in 1958. … From what 
I have heard, these items had not been preserved properly, and in fact, they were 
in poor condition. They are actually far from being qualified as invaluable 
artifacts. For example, some beads are missing from one of the necklaces, and 
there are quite a few duplicates of the books.
Nakamura Umekichi: … Let me make a few comments on the selection criteria 
for the cultural properties. There was no specific guideline as to how we selected 
those items, and the list was completed based on discussions with our Korean 
counterpart. … In all fairness, we didn’t think it was particularly necessary to 
return the artifacts if similar artifacts already existed in Korea. We dismissed 
some of Korea’s requests in accordance with such logic, for they can conduct 
their research on those cultural properties with the items they already have. … 
Also, responding to the earlier comment that the list does not include any 
national treasures or important cultural properties, it was not intentionally done 
so; we followed the same reasoning I just mentioned, and as you pointed out, 
none of the items listed in the agreement was classified as national treasures or 
important cultural property.
To sum up, both the Korean and Japanese governments took part in the 
compilation of the list of cultural artifacts which were to be returned to Korea, 
and some of the items were dismissed and excluded from the list based on the 
fact that similar ones were already in Korea’s possession—as a result, the list did 
not include a single artifact that was categorized as Japan’s national treasure or 
important cultural property. However, such selection criteria were not applied to 
all cases discussed during the agreement talk. One example was the relics of the 
Yangsan Couple’s Grave. 
The Yangsan Couple’s Grave is a large-scale ancient burial mound located in 
Yangsan, South Kyǒngsang Province, which was excavated by Government-
General of Korea in 1920. The relics found in the grave were carried to the 
Tokyo Imperial Household Museum (today’s Tokyo National Museum), and at 
the time of Korea-Japan Talks, they were preserved in the Tokyo National 
Museum. The burial mound was created after the husband died first in the mid-
fifth century, and the wife joined after her passing. The relics found in the grave, 
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such as gilt-bronze shoes and jewelry have been identified to have a close 
connection with the Silla period between the fifth and sixth century, and are 
considered to be critically important in the study of ancient history of the 
Korean Peninsula.9 What, then were the reasons behind Japan’s dismissal of 
restitution requests from Korea for these artifacts? 
On March 22, 1965, the MOFA’s Northeast Asia Division held the Conference 
on Cultural Properties. At this conference, cultural properties specialists and the 
government officials from the MOFA gathered to discuss the matter of cultural 
property restitution, which was to take place with the conclusion of the Korea-
Japan talks, exchanging their views on the list of cultural properties to be 
returned to Korea. The participants were: Matsushita Takaaki, director of Fine 
Arts Division, Cultural Properties Protection Committee; Tanaka Sakutarō, 
director of Archeology Division, Tokyo National Museum; Hariya Masayuki, 
director of Cultural Projects, the MOFA; Yanagiya Kensuke, secretary of 
Northeast Asia Division; Morita and Tajima as administrative staff members. 
The most striking content found in the report is that, despite Korea’s consistent 
request, the Cultural Properties Protection Committee as well as Tokyo National 
Museum refused to return the relics from the Yangsan Couple’s Grave. The 
following statement from Matsushita clearly illustrates the underlying logic of 
Japan’s dismissal: 
Director Matsushita, from a purely academic viewpoint, said, “These invaluable 
artifacts demonstrate the relationship between ancient Mimana [Kaya in Korean] 
and Japan, and even though similar crafts can be found in Korea, they are 
nonexistent in Japan.” Director Tanaka, on the other hand, explained how the 
artifacts were acquired in the first place, saying, “When the Chosŏn Historical 
Remains Research Association (Chōsen Koseki Kenkyūkai) first excavated the 
grave, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science made a yearly donation of 
twenty-thousand yen over the period of three years, the Imperial Household 
Agency donated five-thousand yen, and the Royal Yi Family donated three-
thousand yen to finance the excavation. In return, a third of what had been found 
in the grave was donated to the Tokyo National Museum. In addition, the 
Government-General paid the landowners in cash that is equivalent to two to 
three years’ worth of crop production. Therefore, the authorities had not taken 
these artifacts by force.” To this, Mr. Morita mentioned, “In relation to this issue, 
a Korean newspaper wrote last March that these items must undoubtedly be 
returned to Korea. And if two-thirds of what was found at the site remained in 
Korea, it is likely that Korea would insist on getting them back for the purpose of 
9. Munhwajaech’ŏng [Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea] search engine. Accessed 
September 29, 2014. http://www.cha.go.kr/korea/heritage/search/Culresult_Db_View.jsp?mc= 
NS_04_03_01&VdkVgwKey=13, 00930000, 38. 
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preserving the entire collection.” Director Matsushita replied, “The purpose of 
this restitution is to promote a sense of amity between Japan and Korea. Giving 
up these important cultural properties that prove ancient cultural exchange 
between Japan and the Korean Peninsula would rather antagonize Korea 
specialists in Japan. Also, if they insist on preserving the entire collection, I 
would rather prefer the rest of the collection to be handed to us.” … Secretary 
Yanagiya explained the recent development of the Japan-Korea talks, adding that 
there is a possibility that a conference session will be held in April relating to the 
issue of cultural properties. Director Matsushita urged that, “There should be no 
political transaction when it comes to donating cultural properties. It is especially 
undesirable for the relics from the Yangsan Couple’s Grave to be the subject of 
political give-and-takes. If such demand turns out to be unavoidable, I will 
consider selecting some of the remains of the grave and hand them over to 
Korea.” (Gaimushō Hokutōajia-ka 1965)
Strictly speaking, Director Matsushita maintains that the relics from the 
Yangsan Couple’s Grave cannot be returned to Korea because they are invaluable 
cultural resources that explain the ancient relationship between Japan and the 
Korean Peninsula, which, in his view, extends to Japan’s relationship with 
ancient “Mimana.” 
As is widely known, since the Meiji period, Japan often referred to the 
relationship between “Mimana” and Japan as the justification for its colonial 
expansion to Korea, arguing that Japan’s colonial rule on the Korean Peninsula 
began as Japan established an outpost in “Mimana” during the Yamato Period. 
In their view, returning the relics from the Yangsan Couple’s Grave was 
inconceivable because they were the only remaining evidence to prove the long-
standing relations between Japan and “Mimana” (i.e. Korea). Director Matsushita 
was adamant in insisting that, if the logic of the Korean government’s demand for 
restitution of the relics laid in the preservation of the entire collection, then 
Japan would be willing to take over the remaining two-thirds of the artifacts in 
Korea. He further added that under no circumstances should the relics become 
the means of political compromise during the negotiation talks. Despite the fact 
that the purpose of the restitution of cultural properties was to celebrate the 
normalization of bilateral relations as well as Korea’s independence, it is possible 
to find that the logic of colonial rule lingered on well into the negotiation 
process. 
The relics from the Yangsan Couple’s Grave became the subject of discussion 
in the Upper House session on December 10, 1965, during which the JSP 
member Matsunaga Chūji criticized the government for not returning them to 
Korea:
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Matsunaga Chūji: What needs to be pointed out here is the fact that our 
government refused the fervent request by the Korean government for the 
restitution of the relics found in the Yangsan Couple’s Grave. Now it is my 
understanding that our refusal was based on the fact that those relics were 
brought into Japan legally. We basically abided by the principle that we would not 
return the items if similar kinds of artifacts already existed in Korea, and the 
relics from the Yangsan Couple’s Grave were not returned based on this principle. 
…
 From this perspective, as I have mentioned earlier, the text of the Treaty, which 
is supposed to reflect our strong empathy for the independence of the Korean 
people, are insufficient in pursuing its purpose. To our regret, this is something 
we need to point out to our government. … France and Britain continue to hold 
onto the cultural properties they acquired during their colonial rules and display 
them at museums in their own countries as if they are proud of their past actions. 
We should learn from such wrongdoings and instead consider returning what we 
have acquired in the Korean Peninsula during the colonial period. Especially, we 
strongly urge our government to reconsider the restitution of the relics from the 
Yangsan Couple’s Grave, which is now our national property, given that their 
return is desired most passionately by the Korean people. (Dai 50-kai Kokkai 
Sangiin Honkaigi kaigiroku [13-gō], 1960)
To summarize Congressman Matsunaga’s criticism, the Japanese government 
rejected Korea’s fervent restitution request for the relics of the Yangsan Couple’s 
Grave, and such rejection does not conform to the underlying purpose of the 
restitution of the cultural properties, “celebration of Korea’s independence.” 
Aside from the issue of the historical accuracy of Japan’s “colonial rule” in 
“Mimana,” both the Cultural Assets Preservation Committee, that was in charge 
of supervising the cultural properties, and the Tokyo National Museum were 
considerably fixated on the association between the Yangsan Couple’s Grave and 
Japan’s ancient presence in “Mimana.” Furthermore, the mere fact that the 
Government-General of Korea and the Imperial Household Agency financed 
the excavation of the ancient site indicates that these particular remains were 
strongly linked to Japan’s colonial perceptions. Most significantly, Japan’s 
fixation on the relics, which ultimately led to the rejection of Korea’s restitution 
request, elucidates the limitation of the Korea-Japan talks in achieving the 
advancement of the bilateral relations. 
The relics from the Yangsan Couple’s Grave were never returned to Korea, 
even after the signing of the Normalization Treaty. Facing strong opposition 
from Japan, the Korean government demanded additional artifacts, including 
the excavated relics from Kyodong Burial Mound in Changnyŏng and Hwangori 
Burial Site No.16 in Kyŏngju. It is interesting to note that, according to the 
research conducted by the Korean government on the cultural properties that 
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have been returned from Japan, their historical and cultural values are much 
greater than those of the relics from the Yangsan Couple’s Grave (Munhwajaech’ŏng 
2005b, 517). It is undeniable that Japan assigned profound meanings to these 
relics, and their determination to hold onto the relics from the Yangsan Couple’s 
Grave more so than other valuable properties negated the two nations’ professed 
aspiration for the construction of a new bilateral relationship. 
Conclusion
I have tried to show how Japan’s Cultural Assets Preservation Act emphasized 
the preservation and utilization of cultural properties as the medium for the 
advancement of culture for both the Japanese people and the world, rather than 
elucidating the contextual history of each artifact. In addition, when dealing 
with the cultural properties of foreign origins, I have focused on how they 
should be preserved, rather than illuminating the historical context in which 
they were brought into Japan or whether or not they should be returned to their 
original places. During the fourteen-year-long Korea-Japan Normalization 
Talks, some of the cultural properties that originated from Korea and had been 
defined as “Japan’s national properties” found their way back to the peninsula. 
But such transactions were made behind closed doors by the MOFA and the 
Japanese government, while the Japanese people, including the Diet, only came 
to find out about the process through Korean and domestic news media. 
The Treaty on Cultural Properties and Cultural Cooperation between Japan 
and the Republic of Korea, signed after many years of tortuous negotiation, was 
supposed to represent the two states’ efforts to improve bilateral relations. Yet its 
context was heavily colored by the lingering colonial consciousness. And such 
limitations embedded in the treaty were highlighted in the statements found in 
the Agreement Records on the Treaty on Cultural Properties and Cultural 
Cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea, which described Korea’s 
cultural properties as “owned by the Japanese people.”
The bilateral relationship surrounding the issue of cultural cooperation 
continues to be accompanied by deep-rooted mutual mistrust to this day. 
Needless to say, Korea is not the only one with trust issues; Japan also has a 
sense of distrust towards Korea. For example, according to the Diet records of 
the Upper House Budgetary Committee held on November 15, 2011, Liberal 
Democratic Party representative Yamamoto Ichita castigated then Prime 
Minister Noda, concerning the return of the Royal Protocols of the Chosŏn 
Dynasty. Diet member Yamamoto asked Prime Minister Noda whether the 
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government had heard the Korean officials express gratitude upon restitution. 
He asked the same question five times, and on every occasion Prime Minister 
Noda avoided answering the question (Dai 179-kai Rinji Kokkai Sangiin Yosan 
Iinkai kaigiroku [3-gō], 2011, statement of Yamamoto Ichita). Such exchanges 
between the two politicians were similar to what happened in 1958, when Japan 
returned 106 items to Korea. Though only fragmentary records have been 
found, Japan’s attitude toward the issue of cultural properties has not undergone 
significant change. The cultural properties that had been brought to Japan from 
the Korean Peninsula are still considered as Japan’s national properties. 
Further research is necessary to improve such distorted perceptions 
surrounding the restitution process of cultural properties between Korea and 
Japan. As my study has made clear, the issue of the restitution of cultural 
properties is directly related to the perceptions of colonial rule, making it even 
more difficult to find an easy solution. But it does not mean that the two 
countries cannot take preparatory measures, including the promotion of a 
multifaceted academic approach to the restitutions of cultural properties. It is 
my intention to shed light on the political measures made by the Korean 
government during the composition of the Treaty on Cultural Properties and 
Cultural Cooperation in the future and also to conduct further research on the 
restitution of cultural properties that took place after the Korea-Japan 
Normalization Talks. Further, it is my goal to make assessments on how the 
actual restitutions were related to the agreements made during the talks, 
illustrating the situational shifts surrounding the fates of cultural properties. 
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